This article considers the tension between the notion ofaccountability that is present in the terms of reference, findings and recommendations of the Palmer and Ombudsman inquiries, the internal reform process begun within DlMlA and the legislative reform package put so far to Parliament, and the notion of accountability that underpins the principal criticisms of these developments. Before exploring this theme, however, it is worthwhile recapping the regulatory and factual context of the Rau and Solon cases.
The detention and removal ofVivian Solon and Cornelia Rau
The regulatory context for the Palmer and Ombudsman reports was the detention and removal powers found in the Migration Act. Section 189 of the Act imposes an obligation on authorised officers. including DlMlA compliance officers and police officers, to detain any person they know or reasonably suspect to be an unlawful non-citizen. An unlawful non-citizen is defined in the Act to mean a non-citizen who does not hold a valid visa. The legal opinion of the Australian Government Solicitor's Office prepared for DlMlA and . . provided to the Palmer Inquiry. states that an officer is under an obligation 'to keep the person's circumstances under review and to seek to resolve their immigration status as soon as possible by further i n q~i r y ' .~ According to the Australian Government Solicitor this means that an officer 'must be able to demonstrate at any particular time that the suspicion persists and that it is reasonably held'.3 Closely related to s 189 is s 196 of the Act, which requires that an unlawful non-citizen be kept in detention until removed or deported from Australia or granted a visa. In the case of Cornelia Rau, the Palmer Report concluded that her initial detention may have been lawful, given that it was based on a reasonable suspicion that she was an unlawful non-citizen -she spoke German, had a fake passport, and gave conflicting accounts of her identity to suggest she was an unlawful non-~itizen.~ However, the Palmer Report went on to find that the various accounts that she gave of her identity, her origins, and the circumstances of her arrival in Australia (at one point she claimed she had walked overland from Europe to China before paying a Russian people-smuggler to get her to Australia), imposed an ongoing responsibility on officers to persist in making inquiries to identify her. A major finding of the Palmer Report was that there were insufficient internal processes to ensure this ongoing responsibility was met.'
The notion of accountability underlying the Palmer and Comrie investigations
The terms of reference, findings and recommendations of the Palmer and Comrie investigations generally reflect an understanding of accountability in government that is typical of recent trends in public administration and management. Since the 1980s a transformation in the management of the public sectors of advanced countries has occurred by which '[tlhe rigid, hierarchical, bureaucratic form of public administration, which has predominated for most of the twentieth century, is changing to a flexible, marketbased form of public management'.8 This has included not only the transfer of the exercise of public functions to the private sector, for example, the transfer of corrective and administrative detention functions to privately owned corporations like Group 4 Falck Global Solutions, Wackenhut, and Australian Correctional Management, but perhaps more dramatically the techniques and mechanisms of public administration have been 'refashioned' in the mould of the private corporate sector? Contractual and auditing principles now seek to replace 'command and control' as the 'paradigm of regulation'.1°
In Australia, this trend has manifested a willingness to experiment with governance techniques, including a larger role for non-government agencies in formulating and implementing policy. The terms of reference, findings and recommendations of the P?lmer and Ombudsman reports into the Rau and Solqn cases also reflect to a large degree the new matagement values now widespread in public administration. Most significantly, they display a tendency to encourage reliance on internal regulatory controls within DlMlA and between DlMlA and its inter-governmental and private sector partners, buttressed by external supervision by executive bodies or executive appointed boards, as a means of ensuring the quality of decision-making in the detention and removal context. The Palmer lnquiry also made adverse findings about the contractual arrangement between DlMlA and the detention services provider, the renamed GLS (Australia) Pty Ltd (GSL). However, the Palmer Inquiry did not question the appropriateness of outsourcing administrative detention of unlawful noncitizens to a private security provider. Instead, the investigation focused on the lack of adequate controls in the outsourcing agreement with GSL.22 The same concerns had been raised by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), which found that the detention service contracts between the Commonwealth and Australasian Correctional Management and the current service provider, GSL, had not been adequately monitored.23 A particular concern of the ANAO was that there was a lack of sufficient qualitative and quantitative measurements for assessing compliance with the lmmigration Detention Standards. In summary, the general thrust of the Palmer and Ombudsman reports and the surrounding departmental and legislative activity is to enhance existing public management techniques, rather than to consider their replacement with any other model of governance. Accountability, therefore, is roughly formulated as an exercise in ensuring the quality of primary decisionmaking through a system of integrated, and largely executive-focused, internal and external checks and balances. This has meant hybridisation, in many respects, of the key elements of the administrative law model of the 1970s and 1980s, most importantly the adaptation of the Ombudsman to the new role as lmmigration Ombudsman.
Tension with public law values underlying accountability
In comparison to this general formulation of accountability that accompanies the current trend in the 366 -Altl j Vol 30:6 Tlcc 7005 administration of the detention and removal pow rs, is a contrasting notion of accountability that under 1 ins much of the criticism of those developments. It is an understanding of accountability that derives from traditional.public law values, particularly the sep,a tion of powers doctrine, and that is evident in criticism 1 of the current regulatory framework for the detention and removal of unlawful non-citizens. The current regulatory framework is criticised for not providin for an independent judicial mechanism for overse 4 ing the detention and removal of people alleged to be unlawful non-citizens, and not setting out clearly in to these factors is still being debated.
The Senate Migration Act lnquiry received a num er of submissions calling for judicial oversight of the 4 detention and removal powers. The submission of the South Brisbane lmmigration and Community Legal Service to the Senate Migration Act lnquiry represents a common concern of many in the immigration sector:
The power to detain must have checks similar to that when a person is detained in criminal matters. Given the cases of Cornelia Rau and others, and the other adverse findings about detention contractors, the Department should be extremely cautious about detaining people and should welcome further scrutiny. We understand that prior to the 1994 changes that regular judicial scrutiny was available in some cases of detention. Whilst recent softening of the approach and review by the Commonwealth Ombudsman is welcome we subm~t that further change is required.26
These views reflect a belief that the judiciary is ultimately best placed to examine the lawfulness of detention. Referring to the Palmer Report's finding that DlMlA officers had misconstrued s 189 when exercising the power to detain, the Law Council of Australia argues that the government 'has not adopted a best practice approach which balances considerations of efficacy, fairness and proper safeguards to individual libert~'.~' The Law Council further claims that this must be provided by a judicial officer.28
Such criticisms could be read as no more than evidence of the 'lag time' in which public lawyers catch up with the reality of changes in public administration. Certainly, there has been much introspection by public lawyers across jurisdictions seeking to come to terms with changing practices in public management. Michael Taggart, for example, would argue that it was no coincidence that the 'self-conscious identification of "public law values"' in the early 1980s in Britain emerged at the same time as privatisation of government functions.29 Taking this perspective, the insistence on judicial involvement in the detention and removal processes could be seen as a failure to adapt legal mechanisms to the changes in the forms and mechanisms of government generally. Court also recently agreed with the Commonwealth's concession in that case that it owed a non-delegable duty o f care t o detainees. j2 N e w public management techniques designed t o ensure accountability, it could be argued, must take account of the presence of a minimbm standard o f judicial review under the Australiap Constitution.
A related concern t o the need for judicial review of the detentim and removal powers is that the government has failed t o clearly spell out in regulatory form under Indeed, it would be a challenge for legislators t o devise a comprehensive catalogue of duties that could cater for the current outsourcing model o f administrative detention o f unlawful non-citizens in Australia. Howevet presumably the Commonwealth could mould its contractual relationship with GSL t o cater for the legislative provisions (much as it does with the lmmigration Detention Standards) so that if the Commonwealth is found t o be in breach of a legislative duty o f +re, it could seek indemnity from the detention service provider. The principal challenge, however, would bei in setting out clear and transparent statutory standards that were at the same time responsive t o changes in the immigration detention environment, including fhe specific needs of new detainees that may not fit tht? profile of previous detention populations. statutory standards (and judicial oversight o f them) is indicative of the deeper tension between notions of accountability in this area. It is almost as if two different languages are being spoken: the language of performance measures, audit, contractual obligation, and flexible regulation, and the language of rule of law, judicial review, and restrictions on the exercise o f public power.
Conclusion
While there appears t o be a continuing divergence between these positions, studies have also been undertaken which seek t o explore, for example, whether flexibility in institutional design, including the outsourcing of government functions, can be made compatible with the separation of powers doctrine. 36 In this regard, it may be observed that judicial review represents, in many respects, another avenue for attaining the same objects as the new techniques o f public management, most importantly, the review of the appropriateness of a primary decision o r decision of a merits review tribunal thereby encouraging consistent and quality decision-making. It could also be argued that placing the lmmigration Detention Standards in legislative form would only enhance the understanding o f DlMlA and GSL of their respective obligations under the detention services contract. These standards could be realised as positive aspects o f the 'command and control' model of administrative law in the new public management environment. As much as the role of the Ombudsman has been adapted t o the overview o f detention arrangements of individual detainees under the recent amendments, there is potential for new hybrid forms of governance and accountability in the administration of the detention and removal powers. Neverthdess, the fact that the government leans away from this suggestion while the courts and many stakeholdkrs in the immigration sector call for clearer AltLJ Vol306 Dec 2005 -267
